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the Crisis, and the Fund 
Jeffrey A. Frankel 
Until  recently, there were  essentially two schools of thought regarding 
East Asian economic success. According to the first school, the Asian 
miracle illustrated the virtues of the capitalist system. According to the 
second, East Asian capitalism is different from Western capitalism, and 
its dzfferences are the key to its success. Now, after a continent-full of dis- 
appointments, we are led to a third hypothesis. While it may be too strong 
to say that Asia’s differences are the key to its recent failures, we  have 
learned that the rules of economics after all apply to East Asia just like 
elsewhere, for better or worse. 
I will address the policy response to the East Asian crisis on the part of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and G-7 governments, including 
a number of criticisms of that response. But I begin by reviewing the ori- 
gins of the crisis. 
9.1  Origins of the Crisis 
Macroeconomics played some role in the crisis, but not the lead role. 
Some mistakes of macropolicy were made in  1997 in Thailand, for ex- 
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ample.  When  current  account  deficit  turned  to  overall  balance-of- 
payments deficit, the government was too slow to follow the IMF’s advice 
of allowing more exchange rate flexibility. As a result, much of Thailand’s 
reserves were lost, and the crash that followed was worse than it otherwise 
would have been, once it occurred. In this respect, the episode resembled 
the Mexican peso crisis of 1994. It appears that current account deficits 
in excess of 4 percent of GDP are a sign of possible trouble ahead. 
But large-scale borrowing by itself need not lead to a crisis. Statistical 
evidence suggests that a large current account deficit or high level of debt 
is not a highly significant predictor  of crisis. More important than the 
magnitude of the current account deficit is how it is$nanced  and how the 
funds are used. The composition of the capital inflow matters. East Asian 
countries in 1997 relied too much on short-term foreign-currency-denom- 
inated debt (again as in Mexico in  1994). Although securities were sup- 
posed to have achieved a new importance in these countries in the 1990s- 
indeed this was the origin of the phrase “emerging markets”-the  banking 
sector turned out to be central. There was a mismatch between the banks’ 
liabilities and their assets, with much of the money going to speculative 
real estate deals.’ 
The main problem in East Asia was not macroeconomics but structural. 
Deep flaws afflicted the financial system. They include excessive leverage 
and a banking system based excessively on directed lending, connected 
lending, and other collusive personal relations. Ten years ago finance ex- 
perts called it “relationship banking” and thought it might help to mini- 
mize  “problems of asymmetric information and incentive incompatibil- 
ity”; today we call it “crony capitalism.” 
The U.S. financial model-shared  with the United  Kingdom and so 
sometimes called the “Anglo-American model”-is  different. It empha- 
sizes arm’s-length market  relations. For example, firms rely  heavily on 
securities markets to finance investment. To be sure, banks play an impor- 
tant role. But even bank loans tend to be made on arm’s-length terms. 
Certainly the government has little to say about where bank credit is allo- 
cated. One lesson now widely drawn from the crisis-and  I believe cor- 
rectly so-is  that after all, the Anglo-American-style financial structure 
apparently works better than the Japanese-Asian  model (at the risk  of 
overgeneralizing across a heterogeneous set of countries). 
The much-vaunted Japanese financial system is looking tarnished. Pre- 
cisely the attribute of the system that previously appeared to be a virtue, 
the willingness of banks to go on lending to firms in distress (because the 
1. In Frankel and Rose (1996),  high short-term bank debt is shown to be a statistically 
significant positive predictor of the probability of currency crash, while high reserves and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) have the opposite effect. This is research I undertook before 
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banks had  “longer horizons” than impatient American investors), now 
turns out to have led to serious problems. Borrowers who should have 
been cut off were not, with the result that further billions were lost. 
The Asian style of corporate governance tends in the direction of em- 
pire building, that is, maximizing capacity, sales, or market share, rather 
than  what  neoclassical  economic  theory  says  firms should  maximize, 
namely, profitability or the price of the company’s stock. As a result, share- 
holders and consumers have lost out. For a while it looked like this was 
an arcane theoretical point, of interest to economists but not to real-world 
firm owners or workers. How could there ever be too much investment or 
too much growth? Now we  see that Asian firms made precisely this mis- 
take. They developed excess capacity in such sectors as steel and electron- 
ics and are now paying the price. This is what I had in mind when I said 
that the rules of economics turn out to apply to East Asia just like else- 
where. 
9.2  Dangers of “Analysis by Hindsight” 
In pronouncing this verdict, one must acknowledge the dangers of anal- 
ysis by hindsight, dangers of American triumphalism, and dangers of ex- 
cessive swings of  the pendulum  known as “conventional wisdom.” The 
dangers of 20/20 hindsight are clear. Until recently everyone thought that 
these countries had good fundamentals-as  indeed they did, relatively 
speaking. Many of us warned of the drawbacks of the financial system,2 
but few  thought it would lead to a very sharp slowdown, and nobody 
thought the crisis would be this big. 
Financial crises are inherently hard to predict, and one should not after 
the fact perform contortions to explain why  this one should have been 
obvious ahead of time. Statistical results produce warning factors that are 
significant, but they still do not tell us that the probability of a crisis is 
greater than 50 percent. Indeed, if there existed techniques that could pre- 
dict financial crises with high reliability, the market would quickly invali- 
date them: the clever people on Wall Street would adopt the techniques, 
would sell the assets of  any country that was entering the danger zone, 
and would  thereby prevent the crisis situation  from developing in  the 
first place. 
What are the dangers of excessive swings of pendulum and (now) of 
American triumphalism? Not everything about the East Asian economies 
was wonderful before 1997, contrary to much that was said in the 1980s; 
and conversely not everything about them is bad now. 
On the negative side, I have already mentioned the structure of the fi- 
2. My own record can be checked: Frankel (1995,1997). In my view, the only commentator 
who can be truly proud of what he wrote about Asia beforehand is Krugman (1994, 1995). 330  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
nancial system. One should include on the list of Asian economic flaws 
industrial policy, as well as other excessive government interference in the 
economy, and c~rruption.~  I will even venture to cross over from econom- 
ics to politics, at the risk of trespassing (whether on the sovereignty of the 
countries or the turf of political scientists-I  am not sure which is the 
greater danger). We  were told in the past that Asian values placed less 
weight than Western values on democracy, free speech, and other civil 
freedoms. I think many Asians may have concluded recently-even  leav- 
ing aside the noneconomic benefits of such rights-that  there arefinancial 
advantages to the rule of law, transparency, freedom of expression, and 
clearly established procedures for government succession. 
Just as not everything about the East Asians was in fact admirable be- 
fore 1997, so not everything about them is bad now. There was indeed an 
Asian economic miracle. Thirty years ago it seemed that industrialization 
was a privilege reserved de facto for the European-settled regions of the 
world, with the sole exception of Japan. The East Asians disproved this in 
a few short decades. In the original  Industrial  Revolution, it took the 
United  Kingdom fifty-eight years  to double its income  (starting from 
1780). It took the United States almost as long (forty-seven years, starting 
from 1839) and Japan thirty-five years (from 1885). Korea accomplished 
the feat in eleven years (from 1966) and then China just ten years (count- 
ing from 1977).  Among the factors behind the East Asian accomplishment 
were high saving rates, hard work, a strong emphasis on basic education, 
and outward orientation (participation in international trade and invest- 
ment). These are all important determinants of growth that work in other 
countries as well. 
A full acknowledgment of the dangers of analysis by hindsight leaves a 
simple question: If the origins of the crisis lie in the structural flaws of the 
Asian financial system, why  did it occur when it did? What in the eco- 
nomic structure or fundamentals changed between the Miracle and the 
Crisis? 
Perhaps there exist natural stages of development, and the financial sys- 
tem associated with relationship banking was not poorly suited to coun- 
tries at early stages of development. After all, when the alternative for a 
firm is financing all investments out of family savings or retained earnings 
from earlier investments, financial intermediation by  banks is a tremen- 
dously important innovation. And as long as growth is rapid, high leverage 
(i.e., a high ratio of debt to equity) is sustainable, maybe even desirable. 
But when growth slows, the financial system needs to adapt. Firms need 
to reduce leverage. 
Some slowdown in East Asian growth was inevitable after the break- 
3. Economists do not have as much to be embarrassed about, in their 1980s writings on 
the Japanese financial system, as many political scientists and journalists do, in their writings 
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neck pace of the preceding three decades. But the slowdown interacted 
badly with the highly leveraged financial system. The result was crisis. 
Why  do I say that a slowdown was inevitable? On the list of causes 
of rapid East Asian growth was a simple principle that economists call 
“convergence.” (This is in addition to such standard fundamentals as the 
accumulation of physical and human capital and the outward orientation 
of the economies.) A country that starts out behind the leaders in per 
capita income will tend to close part of the gap over time by growing more 
rapidly, conditional on those good fundamentals. The reasons are the high 
rate of return on capital and the opportunity to emulate frontier technol- 
ogy and management practices of the leader countries. But to the extent 
that the gap has been closed after a few decades, this source of growth 
is no longer there. Countries run into diminishing return to capital and 
constraints on infrastructure (including roads, water, and air). As they 
draw closer to the frontier, they no longer have more to learn from those 
that have gone before than vice versa. Japan achieved convergence by the 
1980s, and Hong Kong and Singapore by the 1990s. Korea and the others 
still had a ways to go-a  very long way  in some cases. Nevertheless, the 
basic principle remains, that the smaller the remaining gap, the smaller 
this particular source of growth. 
There were other reasons for the initial slowdown in output growth in 
East Asia, besides the inevitable convergence. One was the bursting  of 
Japan’s pre-1990 asset market b~bble.~  Another was the 1996 slowdown in 
the world electronics market, which sharply reduced the rate of growth of 
exports in these countries before any signs of financial crisis. 
Whatever its origins, the slowdown that had already begun collided in 
mid- 1997 with the long-standing limitations of the financial system. 
9.3  Our Strategy for Dealing with the Crisis 
I will now turn to the strategy that we-the  U.S. administration-have 
used to deal with the crisis. It has three parts: supporting reform programs 
in  individual  afflicted countries; providing  temporary  financing  where 
needed, conditional on those reforms; and encouraging action by our ma- 
jor trading partners, especially Japan, to promote global growth. The sec- 
ond of these measures requires a bit of elaboration. Public funds are not 
a substitute for private funds, only a catalyst or complement to private 
funds. Another way of saying this is that we are “bailing investors in,” not 
bailing them out. The aim is to restore investor confidence. This seems to 
4.  The bubble and its collapse were exogenous from the viewpoint of the rest of East Asia, 
but they were in themselves an example of the interaction that I am identifying. I might even 
go so far as to venture the hypothesis that asset market bubbles are a rite of passage marking 
the arrival of a new economic power on the global stage: Holland in the seventeenth century 
(Dutch tulip mania), England in the eighteenth (South Seas bubble), America in the 1920s 
(stock market and Florida real estate), and Japan in the late 1980s (stock and land markets). 332  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
be working: for example, Korea has recently been very successful at secur- 
ing longer term private finance, returning to the private markets in just 
four months. By way of comparison, it took Mexico seven months in 1995, 
and seven years in the 1980s. 
The central provider of public funds in crises, and monitor of condition- 
ality, is  the International Monetary  Fund, with secondary roles for the 
World Bank and Asian Development Bank. The international financial 
institutions allow us to internationalize the financial burden, which the 
United States and other major countries would otherwise have to bear 
individually. Conditionality is better administered multilaterally as well. 
(Conditionality is the part of the program that spells out and then enforces 
requirements regarding country policies on which the financing is condi- 
tioned.) The IMF is the right institution for the job. It was originally estab- 
lished at US. initiative, it has the requisite technical expertise, and it allows 
us to exercise our influence in a highly leveraged way. I believe it is critical 
that the Congress approve the administration’s requests for IMF funding, 
both the New Arrangements to Borrow ($3.5 billion) and the regular capi- 
tal increase ($14.5 billion). These are not budget expenditures. They are 
more akin to investments, which will not-and  historically have not- 
cost taxpayers one dime. 
9.4  Critiques of the Management of the Crisis 
I have heard a number of critiques of the strategy that we and the IMF 
are following. They fall into three areas: those concerning the efficiency of 
financial markets, those concerning the amount of  financing, and those 
concerning policy conditionality. Many of the critiques contradict each 
other. One might say that for every critique, there is an equal and opposite 
critique. One cannot claim that they necessarily cancel each other out. But 
when a member of the public reads so many attacks on the Fund, he or 
she might be tempted  to conclude that where there’s smoke there’s fire. 
Thus it is important to realize that the critiques come from different direc- 
tions, and to consider carefully the specifics of each one. 
9.4.1  Regarding Efficiency of Financial Markets 
Critique I. Financial markets work best with no government interference. 
There is no need for government action in this crisis. This is the view of the 
“no bailout” crowd. But I disagree that governments and the IMF have 
no role to play in a crisis such as this. There are three reasons why we need 
to be involved and should not simply try to allow the market to solve the 
problem on its own. First is the risk of financial contagion. Much as the 
crisis spread from Thailand to other East Asian developing countries, it 
could spread further, and not always to countries that deserve it. 
Second is the large negative effect on our net exports to East Asia in 
1998. I would not say that this is a tremendous concern as regards impacts Panel Presentation  333 
on aggregate US. growth or employment. Our economy had so much mo- 
mentum going into this crisis-and  still has-that  we can withstand the 
loss of net exports, without losing much output and employment relative 
to what otherwise would have happened. But there is a danger that the 
fall in the trade balance, particularly the bilateral balances vis-a-vis East 
Asia, will lead to an isolationist or protectionist political backlash within 
the United States, which would in itself be harmful. 
Third is the geopolitics. We  have a stake in East Asian economic suc- 
cess. This success is a source of stability and progress in the region itself. 
Korea and Thailand have been and are our military allies, and Indonesia 
is a potential site of social instability. This success is also an example to 
other  developing countries. As  developing countries around  the world 
have opted for capitalism over state planning, they have been inspired by 
the example of East Asia. 
So we  cannot walk away from East Asia. 
Critique 2. This crisis shows that  financial markets work badly; the coun- 
tries should not have opened up to international investors in the  first place, 
and we should not press them to continue to do so now. This critique takes 
the diametrically opposed view of the efficiency of financial markets from 
critique 1. 
I would not claim that modern financial markets work perfectly. Even 
though some of the contagion in this case can be explained by  cycles of 
competitive devaluation, it is true that it is hard to explain all the conta- 
gion in this way.  Investors appear to have had excessive optimism up to 
last year and to suffer from excessive pessimism now. But we are better off 
with modern financial markets than without them. 
There is a useful analogy from Robert Merton, recent Nobel Prize win- 
ner, which I will embellish. Today’s financial markets are like superhigh- 
ways.  They get you where you want to go fast. By  this I mean that they 
are useful: they help countries finance investment and therefore growth, 
and they smooth and diversify away fluctuations. But accidents do occur, 
and they tend to be big ones-bigger  than they used to be when people 
were not able to drive so fast. The lesson is not that superhighways are 
bad. But drivers need to drive carefully, society needs speed limits, and 
cars need airbags. 
9.4.2  Regarding Financing 
Critique 3. Too much public finance is being used to respond to the crisis 
(vs. Critique 4. Not enough). There are two versions of the complaint that 
too much money is being channeled to the crisis countries. The first is the 
question, Why should we  bail out countries that are such tough competi- 
tors for our own firms on world markets? The second variety of the cri- 
tique has to do with moral hazard. Both raise important questions. But 
both have answers. 
In the years prior to 1996, U.S. exports to East Asia grew very rapidly. 334  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
We would like to return to that path. The crisis strategy ultimately helps 
our firms sell to East Asia in three ways: short term, medium term, and 
long term: providing  finance,  so that the countries can continue to buy 
our goods this year (even if at reduced levels); helping to restore growth, 
so that they can buy more next year; and pursuing fundamental market 
opening, so that they can buy still more in the long term. 
Everyone has now learned about moral hazard, the principle that bail- 
ing out investors and borrowers reduces their incentive to be more careful 
next time. The moral hazard point is a correct one, and it enters into the 
East Asian developments in a number of ways. But there is a danger of 
exaggerating it. It is a standard principle of economics that actions in one 
area can generate partly offsetting reactions in another. That is not in itself 
a reason  not to take action. In our highway example, research  demon- 
strates that drivers react to seatbelts and airbags by driving faster and less 
safely than they used to. But that is not a reason to dispense with airbags. 
If it were, that logic would also say that to discourage dangerous driving, 
we  should put a spike in the steering wheel  (as Michael  Mussa  of the 
IMF says). 
Crisis countries already pay large penalties under the current system. 
Standards of living were severely reduced in Latin America after the 1982 
crisis and in Mexico after the 1994 crisis; and incomes will also be sharply 
depressed in  East Asian  countries as a consequence  of  the  1997 crisis. 
These countries would not willingly repeat the experience. 
On the creditor side, securities investors are suffering large losses as well 
(declines in prices of currencies, bonds, and stocks). 
There has been a lot of concern that banks in creditor countries are not 
taking enough of a hit. First, many banks are taking hits. J. P.  Morgan, 
Chase, and Citibank have reported adverse effects on profits. Second, it 
may not be altogether inappropriate that banks make out better than secu- 
rities investors when times are bad-this  is compensation for the fact that 
they do not make out as well when times are good.5 This is not to deny 
that the effort to contain the crisis has an element of moral hazard vis-A- 
vis the banks. If anyone can suggest how to make the banks (who are in a 
strong bargaining position, because they do not have as much to lose as 
in the 1980s) take a larger loss, without unraveling the whole package that 
is holding the line against default, I think Secretary Rubin would like to 
hear about it. 
Beyond that, as we consider what if anything should be done to modify 
the international financial system so as to reduce the frequency and sever- 
5. Spreads earned by banks were quite low before the crisis (Cline and Barnes 1997). The 
usual interpretation  is that this was entirely a supply phenomenon: evidence that bankers 
did not sufficiently incorporate the risks of crisis into their behavior. But it is conceivable 
that there was also a demand aspect to it: that dcveloping countries, observing the effects of 
earlier crises in Latin America, had become somewhat more reluctant to borrow than in 
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ity of accidents in the future, perhaps we  should consider that bank loans 
appear to be one of the more danger-prone modes of international capital 
flows. FDI has the advantage of greater stability. Equities investment has 
the advantage that risk is efficiently shared: in the event of trouble, market 
prices automatically decline. (Perhaps securities investors are less prone to 
panic in an attack than are bankers. They have an illusion of control- 
they can form a mental picture of themselves selling just before a crash- 
much like people seem to be more afraid of plane crashes than car crashes, 
because as drivers they have the illusion of control.) Statistical tests show 
that  the percentage of  capital inflows that  is composed of bank  loans, 
especially short-term or floating rate loans denominated in foreign cur- 
rency, has a statistically significant effect on the probability of a currency 
crisis, while FDI has a significant beneficial effect. 
9.4.3  Regarding Policy Conditionality 
The reforms allow  too much exchange rate flexibility  (vs.  not enough). 
The exchange rate policy debate in  the current context has some of the 
flavor of the debate after the Mexican peso crisis. At that time you could 
read in any newspaper that a foolish mistake had been made regarding 
the currency; you had to read more carefully to figure out that half the 
commentators  were  saying that  the mistake was  not  to have  devalued 
the peso earlier and the other half that the mistake was to have devalued 
at all. 
In the East Asian episode, there is justice in the statement that Thailand 
should have allowed its currency to depreciate earlier. But here as else- 
where, there is danger of exaggerating in hindsight how obvious this was. 
Most  of  the East  Asians had  long been  described as successfully pre- 
venting their currencies from becoming overvalued in the way that Latin 
Americans have historically done. Many Westerners in fact had  urged 
them to appreciate their currencies, in response to balance-of-payments 
surpluses and consistent with the Balassa-Samuelson argument that rap- 
idly growing countries should experience increases in the relative price of 
nontraded goods and therefore real appreciation of their currencies. The 
main  point  I wish  to make with regard to exchange rate policy is  that 
neither currency boards on the one hand nor pure floating rates on the 
other is a panacea. Following good policies is a complicated matter, with 
lots of pieces to the puzzle; one cannot solve all problems with a single 
wave of  the currency wand. And it is important to realize that a fervent 
belief  in the virtue of  free markets does not help settle the debate. Free 
market monetarists are just as passionate in their belief that currencies 
should float, on the grounds that central banks have no business buying 
and selling foreign exchange, as are free market supply-siders in their belief 
that exchange rates should be fixed, on the grounds that central banks have 
no business exercising independent monetary policy. The right answer, fix 
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To elaborate on the currency board: a number of countries have found 
it useful. Indonesia does not currently have all the attributes of a country 
best suited to a currency board. It does have one: desperate circumstances, 
which make it worthwhile to give up some policy independence for mone- 
tary stability. But it lacks others: a small highly open economy, a strong 
desire for economic integration with a major currency country or set of 
countries, the rule of law, and enough reserves or a strong enough banking 
system to avoid converting what would otherwise be a currency crisis into 
a banking crisis. Perhaps the most important element in those countries 
where currency boards have worked is an explicit willingness to give up 
that policy independence, as well as to open the economy and to be ruled 
by the market. 
But it is true that the combination of an overvalued currency and a lot 
of debt  denominated in foreign currency (particularly  short-term debt) 
was a major contributing factor, perhaps the major precipitating factor, 
to the crisis in Thailand, much as it was in Mexico three years earlier. 
The reforms require too much macroeconomic austerity  (vs. not enough). 
Macroeconomic retrenchment is not the central aspect of the country pro- 
grams. The austerity and hardship that the countries are undergoing in 
these programs is the consequence of the crisis and the loss of investor 
confidence, not of  the IMF’s response to the crisis. It is probably inevi- 
table, in circumstances where the priority is to reverse capital flight and 
attract wary investors, that interest rates be raised. If the programs are suc- 
cessful, interest rates can soon be brought back down before they do last- 
ing damage to the real economy. As regards fiscal austerity, it is true that 
the initial agreements with the IMF were predicated on hopes regarding 
economic growth and corresponding budget surpluses that soon proved 
a bit overoptimistic; these targets have since been modified. 
The reforms require too much structural change. The IMF is not simply 
applying the same cookie-cutter  to East Asia that it applied in the past 
to Latin America or other problem debtors. The new country programs 
emphasize structural reform more than macroeconomic austerity. This is 
entirely  appropriate,  in  that  these  countries  have  historically  followed 
good monetary and fiscal policies. The Fund has evolved during its his- 
tory-shifting  from the balance-of-payments problems of industrialized 
countries in the 1950s and 1960s to the currency problems of developing 
countries after 1973 and their debt problems after 1982, and then adding 
the broader problems of the transition economies after 1989. Better that it 
continue to evolve after 1997, to address the financial and other structural 
problems in East Asia, than that (like some institutions) it fail to change 
with the times. 
The most important source of moral hazard is between the Asian gov- 
ernments and their financial institutions and large corporations. Thus we 
are doing the right thing in pushing them to increase transparency and Panel Presentation  337 
supervision, improve governance, open their financial markets, and loosen 
banking relations (directed lending and connected lending). It is a historic 
opportunity to get them to undertake important structural reforms that 
they would not otherwise have done.6 
This is not to say that a country with a primitive domestic financial 
system should necessarily be opened to the full force of international capi- 
tal flows before the appropriate domestic market reforms and prudential 
financial regulations have been put into place. To  conclude with a last 
application of the automobile analogy, if  the planned  route for a super- 
highway draws near to a primitive village, it is not a good idea to design 
an off-ramp that dumps high-speed traffic into the center of town before 
its streets are paved, intersections are regulated, and pedestrians learn the 
dangers of walking in the road. But neither is it practical or desirable to 
try to insulate the village from the modern world indefinitely. Emerging 
market countries should proceed with both domestic reforms and opening 
to the outside world. They need to accelerate the former so as to keep 
pace with the latter. 
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